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Abstract	
	
There	is	much	to	learn	from	what	Turing	hastily	dismissed	as	Lady	Lovelace’s	‘objection’:	
‘digital	computers’	can	indeed	surprise	us.	Just	like	a	piece	of	art,	algorithms	can	be	
designed	in	such	a	way	as	to	lead	us	to	question	our	understanding	of	the	world,	or	our	
place	within	it.	Some	humans	do	lose	the	capacity	to	be	surprised	in	that	way:	it	might	be	
fear,	or	it	might	be	the	comfort	of	ideological	certainties.	As	lazy	normative	animals,	we	do	
need	to	be	able	to	rely	on	authorities	to	simplify	our	practical	reasoning:	that’s	ok.	Yet	the	
growing	sophistication	of	computer	systems	designed	to	free	us	from	the	constraints	of	
normative	engagement	may	well	take	us	past	a	point	of	no-return:	what	if,	through	lack	of	
normative	exercise,	our	‘moral	muscles’	became	so	atrophied	as	to	leave	us	unable	to	
question	our	social	practices?	
	
This	paper	makes	two	distinct	normative	claims:		
	
1. Decision-support	systems	should	be	designed	with	a	view	to	regularly	jolting	us	out	
of	our	moral	torpor.		
2. Without	the	depth	of	habit	to	somatically	anchor	model	certainty,	a	computer’s	
experience	of	something	new	cannot	but	remain	very	different	from	that	which	in	
humans	gives	rise	to	non-trivial	surprises.	This	asymmetry	has	important	
repercussions	when	it	comes	to	the	shape	of	ethical	agency	in	‘artificial	moral	
agents’:	the	worry	is	not	just	that	they	would	be	likely	to	leap	morally	ahead	of	us,	
unencumbered	by	the	weight	of	habits.	The	main	reason	to	doubt	that	the	moral	
trajectories	of	humans	v.	autonomous	systems	might	remain	compatible	stems	from	
the	asymmetry	in	the	mechanisms	underlying	moral	change.	Whereas	in	humans	
surprises	will	continue	to	play	an	important	role	in	waking	us	to	the	need	for	moral	
change,	cognitive	processes	will	rule	when	it	comes	to	machines.	This	asymmetry	
cannot	but	translate	into	increasingly	different	moral	outlooks,	to	the	point	of	(likely)	
unintelligibility.	The	latter	prospect	is	enough	to	doubt	the	desirability	of	
autonomous	moral	agents.	
																																																						
1	I	would	like	to	thank	Chris	Baber,	Simon	Blackburn,	Mireille	Hidebrandt,	Jurgen	Van	Gael,	Michael	Veale,	and	
Alan	Wilson	for	their	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.	I	also	benefited	from	excellent	feedback	from	the	
computer	science	work-in-progress	seminar	here	in	Birmingham.	The	research	leading	to	this	work	was	funded	
by	the	Leverhulme	Trust.	
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We	have	devised	machines	that	help	us	keep	track	of	time,	cultivate	the	earth,	mend	our	
bodies,	survey	the	skies…The	list	goes	on.	Some	aim	to	overcome	specific	physical	
limitations;	others	are	designed	to	entertain.	Many	do	both.	Most	have	had	a	profound	
impact	on	our	understanding	of	the	world,	and	the	role	we	can	play	within	it,	none	more	so	
than	one	of	our	recent	inventions:	‘digital	computers’.	
	
In	that	context,	to	ask	whether	computers	are	able	to	‘take	us	by	surprise’	may	sound	like	a	
redundant	question.	When	it	is	famously	raised	by	Alan	Turing		(Turing,	1950),	nobody	is	in	a	
position	to	predict	the	depth	and	extent	of	the	social,	cultural,	and	intellectual	upheavals	
brought	about	by	their	near-universal	use	today.	Yet	this	historical	upheaval	is	not	what	
Turing	has	in	mind	when	he	floats	the	‘computers	cannot	take	us	by	surprise’	proposition	
only	to	better	dismiss	it	as	unsubstantiated.	Turing	indeed	points	out	that	computers	do	
take	him	by	surprise	all	the	time,	given	their	ability	to	fill	the	gaps	in	his	incomplete	(or	
deficient)	calculations.		
	
That	reply	is	a	bit	quick,	and	not	only	because	it	hinges	upon	some	lasting	ambiguity	in	the	
meaning	of	‘surprise’.	One	can	indeed	use	the	word	quite	prosaically,	to	refer	to	any	
event	or	‘input’	that	we	fail	to	anticipate,	whether	or	not	it	has	any	impact	on	our	
understanding	of	ourselves,	the	world,	or	our	place	within	it.	In	that	mundane	sense,	we	
cannot	but	be	surprised	all	the	time,	given	our	very	limited	ability	to	store	data	and	process	
it.	Yet	that	prosaic	sense	does	not	quite	capture	the	context	within	which	Turing	raises	his	
‘surprise	challenge’.	Turing	indeed	does	so	as	an	attempt	to	translate	the	so-called	‘Lovelace	
Objection’	to	his	claim	that	computers	will	ultimately	be	able	to	fool	an	external	observer	
whose	aim	is	to	tell	the	computer	from	the	human	in	a	question	and	answer	game.	Among	
the	arguments	that	may	be	raised	to	dispute	this	claim,	one	may	point	at	various	
‘disabilities’	of	computers.	Lady	Lovelace	alludes	to	one	of	them	when,	describing	Babbage’s	
‘Analytical	Engine’	(in	1842),	she	notes	that	the	latter	‘has	no	pretension	to	originate	
anything.	It	can	do	whatever	we	know	how	to	order	it	to	perform’.2	
	
																																																						
2	Quoted	by	(Turing,	1950,	p.	12)	
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Lady	Lovelace’s	objection	is	important	in	at	least	two	respects.	First,	negatively,	because	it	
spells	out	a	common	(and	mistaken)	assumption	according	to	which	true	autonomy	
presupposes	an	ability	to	initiate	something	in	a	way	that	is	unprecedented,	in	the	sense	
that	it	is	not	conditioned	by	or	relying	on	prior	norms.	The	romantic	appeal	of	such	a	notion	
of	unprecedented	beginning	as	a	way	of	conceptualising	our	human	ability	(and	
responsibility)	to	give	ourselves	norms	has	misled	many.	Modern	history	has	been	scarred	
by	it:	the	French	revolutionaries’	perceived	need	to	start	a	new	calendar	may	be	the	most	
telling	illustration	of	the	dire	political	consequences	that	can	flow	from	such	an	
assumption.3	When	it	comes	to	beginnings,	and	our	ability	to	give	ourselves	norms,	we	
actually	have	a	fair	bit	in	common	with	computers:	we	do	not	start	from	scratch.	We	
develop	our	norms	on	the	basis	of	prior	norms	and	expectations.	Woven	into	the	fabric	of	
social	interaction	that	structures	our	daily	lives,	these	prior	norms	are	both	given	to	us	and	
re-formulated	by	us	on	a	continuous	basis	–	just	like	the	norms	that	preside	over	some	
computers’	ability	to	learn	from	their	environment	(under	a	reinforcement	learning	model).		
	
Yet	Lady	Lovelace’s	objection	also	hints	at	an	important	way	in	which	‘digital	computers’4	
may	never	be	like	us:	for	want	of	the	deeply	internalised	patterns	of	behaviour	(or	thought)	
that	constitute	human	habits,	their	experience	of	something	new	is	unlike	that	which	in	
humans	gives	rises	to	‘surprises’	in	the	non-prosaic	sense.	Given	the	importance	of	this	
thesis	for	the	rest	of	this	paper,	the	whole	of	section	1	is	dedicated	to	it:	while	section	1.1.	
explores	the	notion	of	surprise	–	as	a	mechanism	underlying	model	change	–	within	the	
Machine	Learning	literature,	section	1.2,	analyses	the	conceptual	link	between	non-trivial	
surprises	and	habit.	Without	the	depth	of	habit	to	emotionally	(and	somatically)	‘anchor’	
model	certainty,	a	computer’s	experience	of	something	new	cannot	but	remain	very	
different	from	that	which	in	humans	gives	rise	to	non-trivial	surprises.		
	
																																																						
3	In	The	Human	Condition,	Arendt	draws	an	important	distinction,	based	on	St	Augustine,	between	‘the	
beginning	which	is	man	(initium)’	and	‘the	beginning	of	the	world	(principium)’	(Arendt,	1998).	According	to	
Arendt,	if	the	French	revolutionaries	had	not	understood	their	task	as	an	absolute,	godlike	beginning	
(principium,	beginning	of	the	world),	which	is	by	definition	beyond	their	capacities,	they	would	probably	have	
been	able	to	avoid	many	of	the	perplexities	(and	ensuing	violence)	they	were	confronted	with.	
4	The	`digital’	qualification	is	important,	for	the	word	`computer’	can	be	used	to	characterise	humans	too:	
more	on	this	in	Section	1.	In	the	rest	of	this	paper,	`computer’	is	used	a	short	for	`digital	computer’.	
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This	asymmetry	has	important	consequences	when	it	comes	to	ethical	agency	and	the	shape	
it	would	take	in	so	called	‘autonomous	moral	agents’:	it	is	not	just	that	the	latter	would	be	
likely	to	‘leap	morally	ahead’	of	us,	unencumbered	by	the	weight	of	habits	(if	it	were,	
preserving	mutual	intelligibility	would	merely	be	a	matter	of	decelerating	their	evolution).	It	
is	also	that	their	moral	trajectory	would	likely	be	qualitatively	different,	given	the	
fundamental	difference	in	the	mechanisms	underlying	moral	change.	The	implications	of	
this	asymmetry	are	spelt	out	in	section	2,	which	focuses	on	the	problematic	assumptions	
underlying	current	efforts	to	ethically	‘train’	(or	constrain)	autonomous	systems	that	are	
capable	of	being	deployed	in	morally	loaded	contexts.	
	
Having	highlighted	the	role	played	by	both	habit	and	surprise	within	the	mechanisms	
underlying	moral	change	in	humans,	section	3	considers	the	consequences	of	this	
conceptual	link	when	it	comes	to	designing	decision-support	systems	meant	for	morally	
loaded	contexts.	These	decision-support	systems	should	be	designed	in	a	way	that	fosters	-
rather	than	dulls-	the	situational	awareness	without	which	humans	lose	the	ability	to	be	
surprised	in	a	non-trivial	sense.	Why?	Because	all	too	often,	all	that	stands	between	us	and	
the	worst	atrocities	is	best	described	as	the	surprise	that	stems	from	encountering	‘the	
Other’.	In	Levinas’	work,	this	encounter	lies	at	the	root	of	our	experiencing	ethical	
responsibility,	by	reminding	us	of	our	common	humanity,	and	the	inescapable	demands	that	
stem	from	it.	Rather	than	shielding	us	from	such	encounters,	decision-support	systems	can	
and	should	be	designed	to	facilitate	them.	This	paper	concludes	with	the	following	question:	
as	significantly	different	‘Others’,	might	computers	ever	be	‘encountered’	by	us	in	a	way	
which	gives	rise	to	non-trivial,	ethically	significant	surprises	too?	I	believe	so,	and	in	that	
way	hope	that	Lady	Lovelace	will	be	proven	wrong,	even	if	this	paper	aims	to	show	the	
importance	of	the	insights	underlying	what	Turing	too	quickly	dismissed	as	her	‘objection’.	
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1. Experiencing	novelty:	asymmetry	between	humans	and	
computers	
	
To	ask	whether	computers	can	‘originate’	anything	in	a	way	that	surprises	us	(as	per	Lady	
Lovelace’s	objection),	one	must	presuppose	a	notion	of	‘surprise’	that	goes	beyond	the	
mere	unanticipated	event	or	proposition:	neither	humans	nor	algorithms	are	capable	of	
100%	accurate	predictions	in	real-life	applications.	Prediction	failures	are	expected.	Some	
events	or	propositions	(whether	they	were	anticipated	or	not)	do	nevertheless	give	rise	to	
surprises	in	a	way	that	goes	beyond	the	trivial,	‘unanticipated’	sense;	they	do	so	when	they	
lead	us	to	reconsider	our	understanding	of	ourselves,	the	world,	or	our	role	within	it.		
	
Some	humans	do	lose	the	capacity	to	be	surprised	in	that	way.	The	force	of	habit(s)	and/or	
the	comfort	of	our	‘certainties’	can	all	too	easily	prevent	the	un-anticipated	from	ever	
disconcerting	us,	with	dire	consequences	in	terms	of	ethical	agency.	Section	3	explains	why	
(and	how)	computers	should	be	designed	to	help	us	in	that	respect.	To	understand	what	is	
at	stake,	however,	one	needs	to	grasp	the	asymmetry	between	the	mere	‘unanticipated	
even/or	proposition’	-whose	experience	is	within	any	computer’s	reach	(1.1)-	and	the	
existential	questioning	of	one’s	understanding	of	the	world	(or	one’s	place	within	it)	that	
stems	from	a	genuinely	surprising	event	or	proposition.	The	depth	of	that	experience	is	
conceptually	linked	to	the	mechanisms	underlying	habit	formation	(and	change)	in	humans	
(1.2).		
	
1.1. ‘Surprises’	and	machine-learning	optimisation	strategies	
	
Our	ability	to	be	surprised	in	a	non-trivial	sense	is	most	commonly	compromised	by	habit	
and/or	certainties.	To	what	extent,	if	any,	do	computers	face	the	same	hurdles?	The	answer	
to	that	question	is	largely	dependent	upon	what	one	means	by	‘computers’:	it	is	positive	if	
one	refers	to	those	‘persons	who	carried	out	calculations’,	as	in	its	original	use.	It	is	
currently	negative	if	one	refers	to	‘digital	computers’	or	‘Turing	machines’	(henceforth:	
‘computers’).	It	is	indeed	far	from	clear	whether	such	machines	could	ever	internalise	
repeated	patterns	of	behaviour	in	a	way	that	gives	rise	to	habits	as	humans	experience	
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them.	The	latter	qualification	(in	italics)	is	important:	to	be	efficient,	algorithms	do	capitalise	
on	repeated	patterns	(via	optimisation	or	`bundling’	strategies).	The	difference	-and	it	is	
key-	consists	in	the	nature	of	the	effort	needed	to	break	from	such	patterns.	This	is	
discussed	in	section	2.1.	As	for	certainties,	alogirthms	can	be	designed	so	as	to	preserve	the	
fallibility	of	whatever	model	they	rely	on	to	go	about	their	daily	tasks.		
	
Recent	research	in	fact	draws	attention	to	a	problem	commonly	associated	with	Bayesian	
learning	methods:	because	posterior	uncertainty	is	reduced	with	each	step	–	no	matter	how	
‘surprising’	the	data	sample	may	be	–	model	uncertainty	reaches	close	to	zero	as	the	
number	of	data	samples	increases.	The	resulting	‘inability	to	be	surprised’	compromises	the	
learning	capacity	of	the	system.	The	latter	indeed	requires	a	balance	to	be	found	between	
the	plasticity	necessary	to	being	able	to	draw	upon	new	knowledge-generating	experiences	
and	the	stability	without	which	learned	memories	get	forgotten.	This	insight	is	far	from	
new.5	Yet	its	re-discovery	within	the	field	of	Machine	Learning	is	giving	rise	to	some	
fascinating	surprise-focused	research6,	including	attempts	at	‘quantifying’	surprises7	so	as	to	
devise	mathematical	tools	to	‘help’	Machine	Learning	applications	retain	the	ability	to	be	
surprised.	These	tools	are	designed	to	ensure	that	‘a	small	model	uncertainty	remains	even	
after	a	long	stationary	period’,	thus	ensuring	improved	learning	performance	in	changing,	
dynamic	environments.8		
	
The	notion	that	one	may	sensibly	seek	to	‘quantify’	surprises	will	raise	some	philosophers’	
eyebrows.	While	there	is	a	clear	qualitative	difference	between	the	mere	‘un-anticipated	
event	(or	proposition)’	and	that	which	forces	us	to	re-consider	our	understanding	of	
																																																						
5	“Being	able	to	detect	novel	and	surprising	stimuli	is	necessary	for	efficiently	learning	new	memories	without	
altering	past	useful	memories”	(Carpenter	and	Grossberg,	1988).	
6	While	there	are	clear	(and	interesting)	links	between	the	two,	one	has	to	distinguish	between	surprise-
related	literature	that	is	focused	on	improving	the	learning	performance	of	the	system	(discussed	above)	and	
research	that	is	concerned	with	maintaining	the	interest	of	the	system’s	end-users	by	introducing	
“serendipitous”	outputs,	as	in	recommender	systems.		For	a	survey,	see	(Kotkov,	Wang,	&	Veijalainen,	2016).	
7	(M.	Faraji,	2016;	M.	J.	Faraji,	Preuschoff,	&	Gerstner,	2016)	“Shannon	surprise	Eq.	(2.1)	and	Bayesian	surprise	
Eq.	(2.3)	are	two	distinct	yet	complementary	approaches	for	calculating	surprise.	Shannon	surprise	is	about	
data	as	it	captures	the	inherent	unexpectedness	of	a	piece	of	data	given	a	model	[…]	Bayesian	surprise	is	about	
a	model	as	it	measures	the	change	in	belief	about	model	parameters.”	(M.	Faraji,	2016,	p.	12).	
8	(M.	Faraji,	2016,	p.	39)	“This	remaining	uncertainty	ensures	that	an	organism	can	still	detect	a	change	even	
after	having	spent	an	extensive	amount	of	time	in	a	given	environment”.	[Is	the	prior	citation	for	this	quote	as	
well?]	
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ourselves	and/or	the	world	around	us,	some	will	question	the	wisdom	inherent	in	seeking	to	
quantify	the	difference	between,	say,	the	surprise	inherent	in	hearing	oneself	sing	for	the	
first	time	and	the	surprise	one	may	experience	in	discovering	a	foreign	culture.	One	may	
seek	to	accommodate	this	incommensurability	issue	by	borrowing	Quine’s	‘sphere	of	
beliefs’	metaphor.	According	to	the	latter,	what	matters	–	and	what	one	might	seek	to	
quantify	–	is	how	close	the	unsettled	beliefs	are	to	the	centre	of	the	sphere.	The	closer	to	
the	centre,	the	greater	the	surprise,	since	it	requires	one	to	revise	larger	chunks	of	
dependent	beliefs	or	propositions.	Still,	some	might	argue	that	it	remains	unclear	where	in	
that	sphere	profoundly	subjective	(and	aesthetic)	experiences	are	meant	to	fit:	they	might	
have	a	very	significant	impact	upon	one’s	life,	reversing,	say,	years	of	systematic	self-
deprecation	(with	its	concomitant	normative	stands),	yet	appear	fairly	superficial	in	terms	of	
dependent	beliefs.	
	
Could	it	be	that	the	burgeoning	literature	on	Machine	Learning-related	‘surprises’	(and	tools	
to	preserve	their	possibility)	is	in	fact	considering	something	fundamentally	different	from	
that	which	occupies	philosophers	when	they	seek	to	understand	the	role	played	by	surprises	
within	normative	agency?	Section	1.2	considers	whether	there	is	an	inherent	link	between	a	
capacity	to	be	surprised	and	a	capacity	to	form	habits.	
	
1.2. Habit	and	Surprise:	the	flip	sides	of	a	coin?	
	
The	discussion	above	proceeded	from	the	assumption	that	computers	are	capable	of	being	
surprised	(hence	it	makes	sense	to	talk	of	tools	designed	to	preserve	that	ability).	This	
section	aims	to	debunk	this	assumption	by	highlighting	the	conceptual	link	between	an	
ability	to	be	surprised	and	the	nature	of	the	effort	needed	to	overcome	habits.	Considered	
independently	of	that	effort,	the	way	in	which	efficiency	concerns	typically	lead	to	various	
optimisation	strategies	indeed	supports	the	idea	that	there	are	such	things	as	`algorithmic	
habits’.		
	
To	make	an	algorithm	run	more	efficiently,	it	is	indeed	standard	practice	to	`profile’,	i.e.	to	
look	at	which	parts	of	the	software	are	going	fast	or	slow	and	store	underlying	calculations	
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for	certain	tasks.	In	a	dynamic	environment,	where	the	heuristics	that	are	relied	on	to	
determine	whether	such	underlying	calculations	are	still	valid,	over-optimisation	will	
compromise	performance,	just	as	over-reliance	on	habits	will	compromise	human	
performance.	Yet	the	algorithm-human	analogy	when	it	comes	to	habit	only	goes	so	far.	The	
next	paragraphs	highlight	the	importance	of	the	qualitative	difference	in	the	nature	of	the	
mechanisms	underlying	habit	reversal	in	humans	v.	algorithms.		
	
In	all	cases	-whether	it	be	repeated	movement,	posture,	calculation	or	frame	of	thought,	
habit	requires	repetition.	In	the	pattern	shaped	by	this	repetition,	at	some	point	a	habit	is	
formed.	Any	attempt	to	identify	a	precise	moment	in	time	when	a	habit	is	born	is	doomed	
to	failure,	for	diminished	awareness	of	the	pattern	underlying	it	is	key	to	its	emergence.9	
While	one	can	intentionally	seek	to	develop	some	habit,10	the	latter	is	born	only	once	the	
behaviour,	posture	or	frame	of	thought	underlying	it	has	become	so	internalized	that	it	
takes	effort	to	bring	it	back	to	conscious	awareness.	This	notion	of	‘effort	to	bring	it	back	to	
conscious	awareness’	is	absolutely	essential	to	the	existence	of	a	habit:	you	have	not	
developed	a	habit	until	the	pattern	of	behaviour	underlying	it	slips	from	your	consciousness,	
even	if	momentarily.	Since	computers	arguably	lack	‘conscious	awareness’11,	one	could	
straight	away	conclude	that	they	are	incapable	of	forming	habits.	
	
But	let’s	–	for	the	sake	of	argument	–	adopt	an	agnostic	or	lax	understanding	of	
consciousness,	according	to	which	computers	would	develop	‘conscious’	response	patterns	
(based	on,	say,	hyper-personalised	anticipation	of	their	users’	tasks).	The	processing	effort	
required	on	the	part	of	computers	to	overcome	such	patterns	would	still	be	fundamentally	
different	from	the	kind	of	effort	required	of	humans	to	overcome	deeply	ingrained	habits.	
	
																																																						
9	External	observation	necessarily	comes	too	late.	
10	Habits	can	be	acquired	in	many	ways:	intentionally	(for	instance	to	foster	the	realisation	of	a	particular	goal)	
or	unintentionally	(through	upbringing	or	simply	responding	to	particular	environmental	features	that	shape	
one’s	behaviour).	
11	Those	who	claim	that	one	day,	as	a	result	of	increased	computational	power	and	some	rather	mysterious	
‘complexity’,	computers	may	well	wake	up	to	their	own	existence		(Du	Sautoy,	2016)	have	yet	to	specify	what	
distinct	‘consciousness	enabling’	features,	if	any,	such	conscious	computers	would	have.	(Tallis,	2011)	
brilliantly	exposes	the	pitfalls	(and	naivety)	of	the	materialist	reductivism	that	conditions	endeavours	to	
‘measure’	consciousness	or	locate	its	seat	in	the	brain.	
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This	qualitative	difference	matters,	and	reflects	the	role	of	somatic	markers	in	the	process	
of	habit	acquisition.	According	to	Damasio’s	theory	(Damasio,	1996)	(Damasio,	2008),	for	
each	action	that	is	in	the	process	of	becoming	habitual,	the	brain	accumulates	information	
about	the	somatic	outcomes	(what	bodily	sensations	are	associated	with	that	action)	and	
encapsulates	that	information	into	an	intuitive	‘marker’	that	is	subsequently	activated	(and	
steers	behaviour)	in	any	context	relevant	to	that	action.	Even	those	who	challenge	
Damasio’s	somatic	marker	theory	readily	concede	the	essential	role	played	by	bodily	
sensations	in	the	formation	-and	reversal-	of	habits.	The	latter,	habit	reversal	process	can	be	
painful	(smoking	cessation	is	the	easiest	example)	or	utterly	disorienting:	Proust	for	instance	
compares	the	effect	of	certain	novels	to	`temporary	bereavements,	abolishing	habit’.12	
Might	digital	computers	ever	experience	the	process	necessary	to	habit	reversal	in	such	a	
`bereavement-like’	fashion?13	It	would	be	pure	speculation	-and	thus	somewhat	pointless-	
to	try	to	answer	that	question	today.	The	amplitude	of	the	challenge	at	stake	however	
warrants	scepticism	when	it	comes	to	the	purported	ability	of	digital	computers	to	develop	
habits	–and	hence	to	be	surprised	in	a	non-trivial	sense.	
	
Now,	some	might	want	to	ask:	why	should	this	inability	to	develop	habits	matter	at	all	in	
terms	of	one’s	capacity	to	be	surprised?	One	might	think	that	this	inability	is	a	good	thing,	
given	the	extent	to	which	habits	can	stand	in	the	way	of	surprises.	Yet	habits	do	not	only	
compromise	our	ability	to	be	surprised.	They	also	enable	it.	Without	habits,	we	would	be	
perpetually	clueless.	Habits	not	only	shape	and	determine	our	sense	of	self,	they	are	also	at	
the	root	of	our	understanding	of	the	world,	both	as	it	is	and	as	it	should	be.	To	concede	that	
habits	are	at	the	root	of	most	of	our	normative	stands,	determining	what	values	we	endorse	
and	what	type	of	life	is	seen	as	worth	living,	goes	against	the	dominant,	intellectualist	
tradition.	The	latter	likes	to	think	that	it’s	our	conscious,	deliberative	self	that	is	exclusively	
in	charge	–	at	least	when	it	comes	to	ethics	and	morality.	We	have	known	for	some	time	
that	this	is	not	the	case.	Yet	even	now	that	we	have	extensive	evidence	suggesting	that	
																																																						
12	(Proust,	1996,	p.	642)	
13	In	the	context	of	a	workshop	discussion,	Chris	Baber	suggested	the	possibility	of	designing	a	computer	
system	in	such	a	way	as	for	the	latter	to	trigger	some	electrical	short-circuit	whenever	a	habit	(or	repeated	
pattern)	needs	to	be	reversed:	this	is	one	possible	way	in	which	one	may	seek	to	mirror	the	human	experience	
of	habit	reversal	–	it	is	of	course	an	open	question	whether	such	`mirroring’	ambition	is	desirable	(see	section	
2.2.	for	possible	arguments	backing	such	mirroring	aim).	
	 11	
culturally	acquired	habits	of	evaluation	and	the	intuitions	they	give	rise	to	have	a	direct,	
causal	impact	on	most	of	our	moral	judgments	(Haidt,	2008),	the	impact	of	this	
intellectualist	tradition	remains	considerable.	Studies	of	habit	within	legal	and	moral	
philosophy	indeed	remain	few	and	far	between,	and	have	yet	to	be	taken	on	board	by	those	
computer	scientists	delving	into	the	need	for	‘value-aligned	systems’.	
	
If	the	ability	to	be	surprised	is	indeed	concomitant	with	a	capacity	to	develop	habits,	could	it	
be	that	the	blossoming	Machine-Learning	literature	which	emphasises	the	role	of	(and	need	
to	preserve)	the	ability	to	be	‘surprised’	is	in	fact	talking	about	something	else?	As	a	distinct	
but	closely	related	concept,	‘artificial	curiosity’		(Ngo,	Luciw,	Foerster,	&	Schmidhuber,	2012;	
Storck,	Hochreiter,	&	Schmidhuber,	1995)	better	captures	the	concerns	of	those	seeking	to	
improve	the	learning	performance	of	Machine	learning	applications.	Because	it	is	designed	
to	rely	on	the	information	that	is	gathered	at	each	stage	to	adapt	or	fine-tune	its	
parameters,	a	learning	algorithm	is	by	necessity	only	as	good	as	the	data	it	has	been	fed.	If	it	
has	to	function	in	a	dynamic	environment,	or	at	least	one	that	is	not	as	stable	as	anticipated,	
the	learning	algorithm	is	likely	to	produce	sub-optimal	results.	The	problem	is	that	the	
algorithm	itself	is	unlikely	to	be	able	to	grasp	the	instability	of	the	environment	within	which	
it	is	made	to	function,	unless	extra,	‘artificial	curiosity’	constraints	are	introduced.	The	latter	
would	prompt	the	system	to	actively	extend	the	range	of	instances	over	which	they	have	
data	and	look	for	uncommon,	‘black	swan	events’14	that	might	demand	some	model	
alteration	(thus	counter-balancing	the	Bayesian	tendency	towards	near-zero	model	
uncertainty).		
	
	The	resulting	dynamism	of	the	process	underlying	model	formation	(and	alteration)	is	
important	in	more	than	one	respect.	Aside	from	improving	the	performance	of	the	system	
itself,	I	argue	that	such	dynamism	conditions	the	very	possibility	of	ever	deploying	
autonomous	systems	meant	for	morally	loaded	contexts,	given	that	ethics	cannot	but	
remain	a	work	in	progress.	This	argument	-’Thesis	2’-	is	unpacked	in	the	following	section.		
	
																																																						
14	The	data-mining	literature	that	focuses	on	the	detection	of	anomalies	within	noisy	data-sets	(Eskin,	2000)	
proceeds	from	a	different	starting	point	(in	that	the	data	is	given)	but	the	underlying	logic	is	similar.	
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2. Autonomous	systems	fit	for	dynamic,	morally-loaded	contexts	
	
This	section	analyses	the	implications	of	the	following	two	theses	taken	together:	
	
Thesis	1:	Without	the	depth	of	habit	to	emotionally	(and	somatically)	‘anchor’	model	
certainty,	a	computer’s	experience	of	something	new	cannot	but	remain	very	
different	from	that	which	in	humans	gives	rise	to	non-trivial	surprises.	This	thesis	
was	the	focus	of	section	1.	
	
Thesis	2:	Ethics	cannot	but	remain	a	work	in	progress.	This	thesis	(henceforth	the	
‘work	in	progress	view’)	reflects	an	understanding	of	moral	values	that	is	often	left	
unarticulated,	especially	by	those	who	support	the	opposite	view,	according	to	
which	a	final,	definitive	answer	to	the	‘how	should	we	[I]	live’	question	is	both	
desirable	and	in	principle	available	to	us	(henceforth	the	‘final	view’).	The	latter	
stand	silently	underlies	much	of	the	literature	on	the	so-called	‘value-alignment	
problem’	(led	by	the	work	of	Bostrom15	and	others).		
	
Section	2.1.	unpacks	the	implications	of	either	account	of	moral	values	(‘final’	v.	‘work	in	
progress’)	when	it	comes	to	discussing	the	possibility	of	-and	design	challenges	inherent	in-	
autonomous	systems	meant	for	morally	loaded	contexts.	Section	2.2.	moves	on	to	consider	
the	desirability	of	such	systems	if	theses	1	and	2	are	both	correct.	
	
2.1. Beyond	axiological	identification	and	incorporation:	the	need	for	moral	
change	mechanisms	
	
	
Current	efforts	to	ethically	‘train’	(or	constrain)	autonomous	systems	that	are	capable	of	
being	deployed	in	morally	loaded	contexts	pay	little	attention	-if	any-	to	the	difficulties	that	
stem	from	the	unavoidable	need	for	moral	change.	The	challenge	inherent	in	those	systems	
having	to	take	into	account	a	wide	range	of	moral	values	is	often	referred	to	as	the	‘value-
																																																						
15	(Bostrom,	2014)	
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alignment	problem’.	Its	discussion	is	currently	dominated	by	the	assumption	that	one	may	
validly	approach	this	problem	as	one	involving	the	two	first	challenges	below:	
	
-Challenge	1:	Identification.	One	needs	to	somehow	identify	a	set	of	‘valid’	moral	values	that	
are	to	act	as	constraints	or	guiding	principles	in	the	operation	of	the	system.	
	
-Challenge	2:	Incorporation.	In	contrast	to	‘top-down’	incorporation	strategies16,	those	
systems	which	proceed	on	the	basis	of	reinforcement	learning	strategies	(effectively	
merging	the	identification	and	incorporation	challenges)	have	the	merit	of	being	compatible	
with	an	acknowledgment	of	the	dynamic	nature	of	moral	values,	but	fail	to	take	on	board	
the	asymmetry	in	the	nature	of	the	mechanisms	that	may	plausibly	underlie	moral	change	in	
humans	v.	computer	systems.	This	asymmetry	is	at	the	root	of	the	unacknowledged,	third	
challenge	-’Mechanisms	for	change’-	discussed	below.	
	
Before	turning	to	the	latter,	it	is	important	to	emphasise	that	the	task	of	identifying	and	
then	incorporating	a	set	of	moral	values	that	operates	as	relevant	constraints	on	an	
autonomous	system	is	not	particularly	affected	by	the	extent	to	which	one	upholds	the	
‘final’	or	‘work	in	progress’	understanding	of	moral	values.	Whether	or	not	one	entertains	
the	idea	that	a	‘final’,	uniquely	correct	answer	to	the	question	of	how	we	should	live	
together	is	both	desirable	and	in	principle	available,	as	a	matter	of	fact	that	answer	tends	to	
be	the	object	of	controversy	and	disagreement	in	any	society.	Researchers	working	on	the	
so-called	‘value-alignment	problem’	(or	‘value-loading	problem’17)	acknowledge	this,	and	
there	is	already	significant	work	endeavouring	to	tackle	the	issues	raised	by	the	contested	
nature	of	relevant	moral	values.18	Along	this	line,	reinforcement	learning	(RL)	strategies	may	
be	deemed	to	stem	at	least	in	part	from	an	effort	to	circumvent	the	vexed	‘identification	
challenge’:	instead	of	coding	ethical	values	‘by	hand’,	the	idea	is	to	let	data	train	the	system.	
																																																						
16	This	focus	on	top-down	incorporation	strategies	is	openly	visible	in	the	2016	IEEE	report:	`The	conceptual	
complexities	surrounding	what	“values”	are	make	it	currently	difficult	to	envision	AIS	that	have	computational	
structures	directly	corresponding	to	values.	However,	it	is	a	realistic	goal	to	embed	explicit	norms	into	such	
systems,	because	norms	can	be	considered	instructions	to	act	in	defined	ways	in	defined	contexts.’	(IEEE,	
2016,	p.	22).	See	also	(Anderson	and	Anderson	2011)	(Arnold,	Kasenberg,	&	Scheutz,	2017)	for	the	perspective	
of	`adding’	or	incorporating	`top-down’	some	kind	of	ethics	to	a	system’s	decision-making	procedures.		
17	(Bostrom,	2014)	
18	For	a	discussion	of	the	concrete	challenges	raised	by	the	“contested”	nature	of	the	moral	values	informing	
algorithmic	content	moderation,	see	(Binns,	Veale,	Van	Kleek,	&	Shadboldt,	2017).	
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Yet	in	contrast	to	both	supervised	and	unsupervised	learning	approaches,	the	set	of	data	on	
the	basis	of	which	RL	methods	proceed	is	not	given	a	priori:	the	data	is	generated	by	the	
artificial	agent’s	interaction	with	the	environment.	The	aim	of	the	learning	process	is	to	
come	up	with	an	action-selection	policy	that	minimises	some	measure	of	long-term	cost,	
which	is	determined	on	the	basis	of	a	-continuously	updated-	utility	function.	Aside	from	the	
difficulty	inherent	in	articulating	the	initial	utility	function,	traditional	reinforcement	
learning	methods	are	vulnerable	to	deception	on	the	part	of	the	system:	‘an	AI	system	
might	manipulate	its	reward	functions	in	order	to	accomplish	the	goals	that	it	holds	as	most	
important,	however	unethical	its	effects	on	human	beings’.19		
	
Inverse	reinforcement	learning	methods,	by	contrast,	do	not	proceed	from	a	given,	initial	
utility	function:	the	system	is	meant	to	infer	the	latter	function	from	observed	behaviour.	
Russell	et	al.20	propose	this	behaviourist,	bottom-up	approach	as	a	way	of	approximating	
our	expectations	for	an	ethical	system:	as	these	inferred	expectations	evolve,	the	system	is	
meant	to	update	its	utility	function	accordingly,	thus	in	principle	solving	the	‘mechanisms	
for	change’	challenge	discussed	below.	Yet	there	are	two	fairly	major	difficulties	inherent	in	
this	approach:	first,	one	cannot	but	dangerously	over-simplify	(and	distort)	ethical	
aspirations	if	one	allows	observed	behaviour	to	be	their	sole	determinant.	The	IRL	method	is	
also	likely	to	heavily	reinforce	the	status-quo:	this	is	in	part	because	it	is	unlikely	to	pick	up	
the	significance	of	seemingly	isolated	civil	disobedience	or	morally	courageous	acts.	It	is	also	
because	(just	like	other	methods),	if	successful,	its	freeing	us	from	the	normative	work	
required	to	answer	the	‘how	should	we	[I]	live?’	question	may	leave	us	content	to	‘tag	
along’,	unable	to	appreciate	the	very	point	of	engaging	with	such	a	question.	
	
-Challenge	3:	Mechanisms	for	change.	
	
For	those	who	entertain	the	idea	that	a	final	answer	to	the	‘How	should	I	[we]	live?’	
question	is	not	only	available	in	principle,	but	desirable,	the	prospect	of	developing	some	
																																																						
19	(Arnold	et	al.,	2017)	
20	(Russell,	Dewey,	&	Tegmark,	2015)	
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superintelligence	on	whose	superior	cognitive	capacities	we	could	rely	on	‘to	figure	out	just	
which	actions	fit	[what	is	morally	right]’21	is	extremely	attractive:	
	
‘The	idea	is	that	we	humans	have	an	imperfect	understanding	of	what	is	right	and	
wrong,	and	perhaps	an	even	poorer	understanding	of	how	the	concept	of	moral	
rightness	is	to	be	philosophically	analyzed:	but	a	superintelligence	could	understand	
these	things	better’.22	
	
The	notion	that	there	is	a	concept	of	‘moral	rightness’	whose	contours	do	not	depend	in	any	
way	on	our	all	too	human,	fallible,	short-sighted	nature	has	a	long	pedigree	in	the	history	of	
moral	philosophy	(its	roots	can	be	found	in	Plato).	On	this	account,	all	we	need	to	rescue	us	
from	our	persistent	moral	failings	is	a	once-and-for-all	source	of	enlightenment.	A	
superintelligence	that	does	not	share	in	any	of	our	shortcomings	-biological	or	otherwise-	
could	provide	precisely	that,	and	more	(it	might	also	figure	out	a	way	to	motivate	us	to	act	
according	to	‘moral	rightness’).	There	is	neither	room	nor	need,	on	this	account,	for	any	
‘mechanism	for	moral	change’:	life’s	circumstances	might	change,	but	‘moral	rightness’	does	
not…Or	does	it?	
	
The	tradition	that	questions	the	extent	to	which	one	may	meaningfully	speak	of	‘moral	
rightness’	independently	of	the	kind	of	creatures	we	are	(itself	a	work	in	progress)	is	almost	
as	old	as	Plato	-its	roots	can	be	traced	back	to	Aristotle’s	moral	psychology.	The	tricky	part,	
on	this	account,	is	to	avoid	throwing	the	baby	out	with	the	bathwater:	there	is	a	crucial	
difference	between	asserting	the	dependency	of	moral	rightness	upon	who	we	are	and	a	
relativist	‘anything	goes’.	Many	have	fallen	for	the	mistake	of	assuming	that	without	moral	
realism	there	is	no	ethical	objectivity	to	be	had.23	Bostrom	has	the	merit	of	explicitly	
articulating	this	assumption	when	he	states:	
	
																																																						
21	(Bostrom,	2014)	
22	(Bostrom,	2014)	
23	Mackie’s	`error	theory’	has	been	influential	in	legal	(and	moral)	theory	(Mackie,	1990)	and	is	indirectly	
referred	to	by	(Bostrom,	2014).	(Putnam,	2004)	exposes	the	extent	to	which	this	assumption	reflects	a	
Cartesian	dualism	according	to	which	there	is	only	one	sort	of	objectivity,	that	of	the	natural	sciences.	
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‘	What	if	we	are	not	sure	whether	moral	realism	is	true?	We	could	still	attempt	the	
[Moral	Rightness]	proposal	[…]	we	could	stipulate	that	if	the	AI	estimates	with	a	
sufficient	probability	that	there	are	no	suitable	non-relative	truths	about	moral	
rightness,	then	it	should	revert	to	implementing	coherent	extrapolated	volition24	
instead,	or	simply	shut	itself	down’.25	
	
Suppose	the	AI	were	indeed	to	shut	itself	down.	What	would	it	leave	us	with?	We’d	still	be	
trying	to	find	our	way	around	the	world,	generally	aiming	for	better	(rather	than	worse)	
ways	of	living	together.	Rather	than	dismiss	as	‘lacking	in	objectivity’	the	rich	background	of	
norms	that	informs	our	ongoing	ethical	efforts,	a	(non-reductive)	naturalism	starts	from	
precisely	such	‘contingent’	normative	practices.	Eminently	fallible,	our	answers	to	the	‘How	
should	I	[we]	live?’	question	cannot	but	be	constantly	changing,	just	as	human	nature	
evolves	as	we	learn	to	live	together.	In	such	a	dynamic	normative	context,	the	process	
through	which	we	engage	with	the	ethical	question	matters	at	least	as	much	as	the	answer	
itself,	for	that	process	renews	the	background	of	normative	practices	that	informs	others’	
ethical	judgment.	
	
Now	imagine	that,	at	some	point	in	the	future,	a	superintelligence	is	somehow	developed	
along	the	lines	considered	by	Bostrom.	Whether	it	is	supposed	to	have	‘cracked’	moral	
rightness	for	us	or	relies	instead	on	our	‘extrapolated’	wish	-’if	we	were	more	the	people	we	
wished	we	were’26,	that	superintelligence	won’t	fool	around.	It	will	set	us	on	the	path	to	
‘righteousness’,	like	it	or	not.	Even	if	it	were	to	find	a	palatable	way	of	imposing	what	may	
otherwise	appear	to	us	as	morally	alien	and	abhorrent	(hence	avoiding	potential	‘human	
override’	procedures),	in	its	bid	to	achieve	moral	perfection	it	may	well	end	up	depriving	us	
from	the	possibility	of	living	ethical	lives.	The	systematic	offloading	of	the	normative	work27	
required	to	answer	the	‘how	should	we	[I]	live?’	question	to	an	AI	may	indeed	leave	us	
																																																						
24	(Yudkowsky,	2004)	defines	our	`coherent	extrapolated	volition’	(which	a	superintelligence	would	be	relied	
on	to	figure	out,	and	implement)	thus:	`Our	coherent	extrapolated	volition	is	our	wish	if	we	knew	more,	
thought	faster,	were	more	the	people	we	wished	we	were,	had	grown	up	farther	together;	where	the	
extrapolation	converges	rather	than	diverges,	where	our	wishes	cohere	rather	than	interfere;	extrapolated	as	
we	wish	that	extrapolated,	interpreted	as	we	wish	that	interpreted’.		
25	(Bostrom,	2014,	p.	loc.	5058)	
26	(Yudkowsky,	2004)	
27	Bostrom’s	characterisation	of	this	work	in	purely	cognitive	terms	reflects	his	robust	realist	meta-ethical	
premises.	
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incapable	of	appreciating	the	very	point	of	engaging	with	such	a	question.	Thus	the	cost	of	
moral	perfectionism	(and	AI-enabled	normative	laziness)	may	turn	out	to	be	the	end	of	
ethics:	we	might	be	normative	animals,	but	without	regular	exercise,	our	moral	muscles	will	
just	wither	away,	leaving	us	unable	to	consider	alternative,	better	ways	of	living	together.	
	
Of	course	we	need	not	adhere	to	the	‘final’	understanding	of	moral	values	referred	to	
earlier.	What	would	an	autonomous	system	meant	for	morally	loaded	contexts	look	like,	if	
we	start	from	the	opposite,	‘ethics	as	a	work	in	progress’	conception?	Such	a	system	would	
have	to	start	from	somewhere.	Even	if	-and	this	is	an	ideal,	‘sci-fi’	scenario	at	the	moment-	
that	system	were	to	learn	to	value	things	sufficiently	slowly	and	progressively	as	to	mimic	
the	human	process	of	growing	up,	it	is	unclear	whether	such	a	system	could	be	said	to	be	
capable	of	developing	habits	(see	section	1).28		
	
Without	habits	to	somatically	anchor	deeply	held	moral	stances,	the	processes	through	
which	an	automated	system	might	be	led	to	change	and	adapt	its	moral	outlook	is	bound	to	
differ	fundamentally	from	that	of	humans’.	The	comparative	ease	(and	speed)	with	which	
such	systems	would	adapt	to	novel,	ethically	challenging	situations	may	turn	out	to	be	a	
mixed	blessing.	It	will,	in	any	case,	confront	us,	humans,	with	creatures	that	may	originally	
have	been	trained	to	think	and	feel	like	us	(and	this	entails	some	ostensible	fallibility),	but	
which	will	potentially	develop	into	creatures	holding	seemingly	‘alien’	views…Just	like	
teenagers?	Rini	draws	on	this	analogy	with	teenagers	to	argue	that	we	ought	to	accept	the	
fact	that	our	‘artificial	progeny	might	make	moral	choices	that	look	strange’.29	In	the	next	
section	I	argue	that	we’d	be	lucky	if	this	relatively	benign	analogy	holds	true.		
	
To	sum	up:	one	cannot	discuss	the	possibility	of	developing	autonomous	systems	meant	for	
morally	loaded	contexts	without	taking	on	board	the	fact	that	we	humans	do	keep	changing	
our	moral	stances.	For	those	who	believe	in	the	possibility	and	desirability	of	a	‘final’	answer	
																																																						
28	This	would	depend	on	the	kind	of	effort	required	on	the	part	of	such	system	to	shake	off	any	`habituated’	
pattern	of	behaviour	(or	thought).	If	there	is	a	qualitative	difference	between	the	effort	required	to	overcome	
such	patterns	and	the	processing	effort	concomitant	with	just	any	other	task,	then	we	might	ask	ourselves	if	
that	system	has	indeed	developed	a	habit.	For	the	reasons	outlined	in	Section	1,	I	remain	sceptical	about	the	
extent	to	which	automated	systems	may	do	so.	
29	(Rini,	2017)	
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to	ethics,	that	fact	merely	reflects	our	all	too	fallible	and	fickle	nature.	From	that	
perspective,	the	prospect	of	somehow	being	able	to	rely	on	a	system’s	superior	cognitive	
prowess	to	figure	it	all	out	for	us,	once	and	for	all,	is	a	boon	that	ought	to	be	met	with	
enthusiasm.	From	the	‘ethics	as	a	work	in	progress’	perspective,	by	contrast,	such	a	
prospect	can	only	be	met	with	scepticism	at	best	(or	alarm	at	worst).		
	
In	terms	of	feasibility,	the	challenge	inherent	in	artificially	introducing	‘mechanisms	for	
change’	that	would	enable	a	system	to	continuously	update	its	moral	stances	in	a	manner	
that	is	both	accurate	and	appropriate	cannot	be	overestimated.	Why?	Either	one	seeks	to	
build	a	system	that	somehow	reflects	the	way	in	which	we	humans	are	constantly	in	the	
process	of	addressing	the	‘how	should	I	[we]	live?’	question.	Given	the	considerable	
tensions	and	discrepancies	inherent	in	that	process,	that	reflection	would	be	a	very	rough	
approximation	at	best	–	or	a	dangerously	reductivist	simplification	at	worst	(see	the	
concerns	related	to	the	inverse	reinforcement	learning	method,	above).	Or	one	allows	the	
system	to	‘leap	ahead’	of	us	and	become	an	advocate	for	the	need	for	change	when	we	
haven’t	quite	caught	up	with	its	necessity.	If	the	(benign)	analogy	to	teenagers	is	to	hold	
true,	however,	they	can	only	leap	so	far	before	we	lose	the	ability	to	have	intelligible	
conversations.	
	
Whether	it	is	met	with	enthusiasm	or	scepticism,	the	ambition	to	construct	autonomous	
systems	meant	for	morally	loaded	contexts	comes	with	a	hazard	that	is	seldom	considered:	
put	lazy	normative	animals	-that’s	us-	together	with	systems	to	which	we	may	offload	the	
task	of	figuring	out	the	‘how	should	I	[we]	live?’	question,	and	what	you	get	are	endless	
moral	holidays30,	and	lazy	animals	tout	court.	Our	capacity	for	normative	reflection	-
																																																						
30	This	concept	of	`moral	holidays’	is	borrowed	from	(James,	2000).	The	following	passage	highlights	its	
relationship	to	what	James	calls	`absolutism’,	or	what	I	refer	to	as	a	`final’	understanding	of	ethics:	`[The	world	
of	pluralism]	is	always	vulnerable,	for	some	part	may	go	astray;	and	having	no	'eternal'	edition	of	it	to	draw	
comfort	from,	its	partisans	must	always	feel	to	some	degree	insecure.	If,	as	pluralists,	we	grant	ourselves	
moral	holidays,	they	can	only	be	provisional	breathing-spells,	intended	to	refresh	us	for	the	morrow's	fight.	
This	forms	one	permanent	inferiority	of	pluralism	from	the	pragmatic	point	of	view.	It	has	no	saving	message	
for	incurably	sick	souls.	Absolutism,	among	its	other	messages,	has	that	message	[…]	That	constitutes	its	chief	
superiority	and	is	the	source	of	its	religious	power.	That	is	why,	desiring	to	do	it	full	justice,	I	valued	its	
aptitude	for	moral-holiday	giving	so	highly’	(James,	1911). 
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querying	how	the	world	could	be	made	better,	rather	than	‘sitting	on	it’31-	is	all	too	often	
taken	for	granted.	What	if	that	capacity	can	be	lost	through	lack	of	normative	exercise?	
What	if	we	enjoy	the	comforts	of	automated,	simplified	practical	reasoning	a	bit	too	much,	
a	bit	too	long?	What	was	meant	to	be	a	‘moral	holiday’	may	turn	out	to	be	a	condition	
which	we	are	unable	to	get	out	of,	for	want	of	being	able	to	mobilise	moral	muscles	that	
have	become	atrophied	through	lack	of	exercise.	
	
The	prospect	of	AI-enabled,	extensive	moral	holidays	may	sound	like	too	exotic	a	possibility	
to	worry	about	its	effects	on	our	capacity	for	normative	agency.	Indeed	there	are	reasons	to	
doubt	the	feasibility	of	developing	such	autonomous	moral	‘agents’,	even	in	the	longer	
term.32	Yet	we	do	not	need	to	settle	this	feasibility	issue	to	draw	a	normative	conclusion	
that	has	an	impact	upon	the	development	of	systems	that	are	already	in	the	process	of	
changing	the	way	we	make	(sometimes	morally-loaded)	decisions:	the	whole	of	section	3	is	
devoted	to	the	much	more	‘down	to	earth’	task	of	designing	decision-support	systems	that	
support	and	foster	our	normative	agency,	rather	than	compromise	it.	Before	that,	section	
2.2.	questions	the	desirability	of	fully	autonomous	moral	agents.		
	
2.2. No	Pinocchio,	no	teenagers	either:	questioning	the	desirability	of	fully	
autonomous	artificial	moral	agents	
	
	
Who	wouldn’t	be	fascinated	by	the	prospect	of	being	able	to	engineer	creatures	designed	to	
overcome	human	frailties	and	limitations	-including,	most	importantly,	our	very	limited	
ability	to	store	and	process	data?	It	is	not	difficult	to	explain	our	captivation	for	the	debate	
surrounding	the	possibility	of	developing	fully	autonomous	artificial	agents	that	are	capable	
of	acting	and	thinking	‘like	us’	(a	debate	which	Turing33	launched	almost	70	years	ago).	
Because	many	identify	our	normative	inclinations	as	a	peculiarly	human	trait	-most	of	us	are	
																																																						
31	When	thinking	of	atrophied	moral	muscles	etc.,	the	image	I	associate	with	this	comes	from	the	film	`Wall-E’,	
depicting	ballooned	humans	each	sipping	their	smoothie	while	watching	a	movie	on	some	floating	cushion:	
due	to	lack	of	exercise,	they	are	simply	unable	to	stand	up	and	have	become	utterly	dependent	on	some	
automated	entertainment	structure.	
32	(W.	Wallach	&	Allen,	2013)	`accept	that	full-blown	moral	agency	(which	depends	on	strong	A.I.)	or	even	
“weak”	A.I.	that	is	nevertheless	powerful	enough	to	pass	the	Turing	test...may	be	beyond	current	or	even	
future	technology’.	
33	(Turing,	1950)	
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not	content	with	the	world	‘as	it	is’,	and	keep	wondering	how	it	could	be	made	better,	
normative	agency	has	become	a	sort	of	‘yardstick’.	If	we	can	develop	artificial	agents	that	
are	capable	of	thinking	‘normatively’,	then	we’ll	have	cracked	the	challenge	set	by	Turing34	
in	the	1950’s:	we’ll	have	created	creatures	that	are	truly	‘like	us’.	Should	we	aim	to	do	so?	
	
Aside	from	fulfilling	some	dubious	‘godlike’	fantasy,	it	is	far	from	clear	why	we	would	want	
artificial,	autonomous	agents	to	be	‘like	us’.	Indeed,	when	it	comes	ethical	concerns,	we	are	
likely	to	be	better	off	if	such	systems	are	significantly	different	from	us.	Different	how?	If	
one	adheres	to	the	idea	that	there	is	a	‘final’	answer	to	the	ethical	question,	the	extent	to	
which	they’ll	end	up	different	from	us	depends	on	how	far	we	-fallible	human	beings-	have	
strayed	from	the	path	of	‘righteousness’.	If	we’ve	strayed	far,	we	might	not	like	what	we	
get…	
	
The	latter	conclusion	is	not	very	different	if	we	start	from	an	‘ethics	as	a	work	in	progress’	
understanding	instead.		Seen	from	that	perspective,	the	challenge	consists	less	in	
determining	what	moral	stands	autonomous	systems	should	start	with,	and	more	in	figuring	
out	how	such	systems	are	to	evolve	in	a	way	that	is	compatible	with	our	constantly	evolving	
attempts	at	coming	to	grips	with	the	‘how	should	I	[we]	live?’	question.	Given	the	very	
																																																						
34	To	bring	home	the	roots	of	the	debate	about	artificial	moral	agency,	some	speak	of	the	`moral	Turing	Test’:	
‘A	moral	Turing	test	(MTT)	might	similarly	be	proposed	to	bypass	disagreements	about	ethical	standards	by	
restricting	the	standard	Turing	test	to	conversations	about	morality.	If	human	interrogators	cannot	identify	the	
machine	at	above	chance	accuracy,	then	the	machine	is,	on	this	criterion,	a	moral	agent’	(Allen,	Varner,	&	
Zinser,	2000).	Allen	et	al.	acknowledge	that	there	are	some	obstacles	inherent	in	this	test	being	used	a	
benchmark	for	the	development	of	artificial	moral	agents:	aside	from	the	fact	that	the	moral	standards	
relevant	to	such	agents	may	have	to	be	more	demanding	than	those	that	apply	to	us,	moral	agency	can’t	all	be	
a	matter	of	the	reasons	one	gives	(but	one	could	tweak	the	test	to	allow	for	comparisons	of	actions	between	
human	and	artificial	moral	agent).	(Scheutz	&	Arnold,	2016)	go	further,	and	highlight,	among	the	problems	
inherent	the	MTT,	the	fact	that	the	MTT	`if	it	carries	enough	similarity	to	the	original	Turing	test	to	deserve	
that	name,	ultimately	and	unavoidably	rests	on	imitation	as	a	criterion	for	moral	performance.	In	turn,	the	
kind	of	deceptive	responses	consistent	with	imitation,	both	as	a	representation	of	the	agent	and	as	a	
substitute	for	moral	action	writ	large,	undermines	a	more	accountable,	systematic	design	approach	to	
autonomous	systems’.	I	would	go	further	still,	and	emphasise	what	a	bizarre	understanding	of	moral	agency	
the	MTT	conveys:	unlike	thinking	(which	was	the	focus	of	the	original	Turing	test),	moral	agency	is	not	a	
predicate	for	which	we	lack	some	essential	criteria.	All	humans	think	(bar	marginal	cases).	But	do	all	humans	
exercise	their	moral	agency?	No.	It	is	certainly	a	peculiarly	human	trait	that	we	are	capable	of	moral	agency.	
When	we	do	exercise	that	capability,	we	deploy	it	in	myriad	different	ways.	Can	we	lose	that	capability?	Yes.	In	
fact,	in	the	`endless	moral	holidays’	scenario	I	have	described	earlier,	one	could	envisage	a	reversed	`moral	
Turing	Test’,	whereby	a	computer	is	asked	to	`blindly’	interrogate	a	human	and	a	computer	in	a	bid	to	
determine	which	is	which:	they	might	find	that	test	much	easier	than	humans	do…	
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different	way	in	which	such	systems	experience	novelty	(see	section	1),	they	are	sure	to	
evolve	differently	from	us,	no	matter	how	much	we	might	try	to	shape	them	in	our	image.	
For	Rini,	we	should	embrace	this	prospect	of	likely	divergence:	
	
‘If	we	are	wise	and	benevolent,	we	will	have	prepared	the	way	for	them	to	make	their	
own	choices	–	just	as	we	do	with	our	adolescent	children.	What	does	this	mean	in	
practice?	It	means	being	ready	to	accept	that	machines	might	eventually	make	moral	
decisions	that	none	of	us	find	acceptable.	The	only	condition	is	that	they	must	be	able	
to	give	intelligible	reasons	for	what	they’re	doing’.	35	
	
While	I	would	embrace	such	a	liberal	stand	when	it	comes	to	teenagers,	for	artificial	
autonomous	agents	it’s	a	punt	too	far,	as	far	as	I	am	concerned.	Difference	can	be	good.	
Indeed,	confrontation	may	be	salutary:	in	the	next	section	I	highlight	the	benefits	of	
designing	decision-support	systems	that	are	capable	of	shaking	us	out	of	our	moral	torpor	
(this	might	involve	some	sort	of	confrontation).	But	we	don’t	need	fully	autonomous	moral	
agents	for	that.	All	we	need	is	a	willingness	to	meet	‘others’:	fellow	human	beings.		
	
	
	
3. Apt	at	taking	us	by	surprise?	Autonomous	v.	decision	support-
systems	
	
	
	
‘[R]obots	will	have	particular	jobs	before	being	general	“actors”	in	society.	So	instead	of	
seeking	a	universal	sense	of	“morality”	across	all	possible	contexts,	should	moral	
competence	not	be	confined	to	the	particular	role	(and	imitation)	that	the	robots	is	
designed	to	fill?	[…]	Robots	will	not	likely	emerge	from	manufacture	as	free-ranging	
citizens	of	the	world,	with	no	particular	vocation	or	role	to	define	their	actions	and	
decision-making.	While	the	range	of	social	robots	can	be	wide,	one	must	ask	what	
limited	set	of	tasks	or	objectives	they	are	at	minimum	designed	to	accomplish.’36	
																																																						
35	(Rini,	2017)	
36	(Scheutz	&	Arnold,	2016,	p.	28)	
	 22	
	
3.1. Decision-support	systems:	Surprising	by	design?		
	
	
Just	as	the	early	days	of	AI	research	spurred	on	a	fruitful	renewal	of	the	(old)	philosophical	
debate	about	the	nature	of	expertise37,	I	believe	that	recent	attempts	at	tackling	what	
computer	scientists	call	the	‘value-alignment	problem’	are	similarly	lending	renewed	vigor	
to	philosophical	reflection	about	the	distinctiveness	of	ethical	expertise.	The	latter	was	first	
(and	most	famously)	highlighted	by	Socrates:	while	one	may	inquire	into	virtue	as	if	it	were,	
or	at	least	resembles,	the	‘expert	knowledge	of	living	well’,	Socrates	reminds	us	that	virtue	
cannot	be	taught	in	the	same	way	as	carpentry	or	seafaring	(or	other	techne)	might.	If	virtue	
involves	any	form	of	knowledge,	at	its	core	is	the	correct	appraisal	of	what	one	does	not	
know.38		
	
This	openness	to	being	‘called	into	question’	(and	possibly	surprised)	is	similarly	deemed	to	
be	central	to	more	recent	accounts	of	ethical	expertise:		
	
‘Ethical	expertise,	in	the	everyday	sense,	is	possible	only	through	a	continual	
openness	to	an	experience	of	self-doubt	reminiscent	of	Levinas’	idea	that	we	are	
‘called	into	question’	by	the	other,	and	therefore	very	different	from	what	is	involved	
in	learning	to	become	expert	in	other	skills’	(Reed,	2013,	p.	247)	
	
																																																						
37	(Dreyfus,	1965,	2005)	
38	Socrates	denies	that	he	possesses	any	expertise	in	arete,	often	translated	as	“virtue”.	Many	interpreters	
question	the	sincerity	of	Socrates’	professed	ignorance.	Yet	one	may	take	this	professed	ignorance	to	be	
merely	disclaiming	certain	or	“expert”	knowledge	(as	in	“techne”)	while	acknowledging	“nonexpert”	or	
“human”	wisdom:	“What	kind	of	wisdom?	Human	wisdom,	perhaps.	It	may	be	that	I	really	possess	this,	while	
those	whom	I	mentioned	just	now	are	wise	with	a	wisdom	more	than	human;	else	I	cannot	explain	it,	for	I	
certainly	do	not	possess	it,	and	whoever	says	I	do	is	lying	and	trying	to	slander	me.”	(Apology,	20d7-e3)	
The	“it”	which	Socrates	otherwise	cannot	explain	is	the	Delphic	oracle’s	response,	according	to	which	no	man	
was	wiser	than	Socrates.	Socrates	is	puzzled	by	the	oracle’s	claim	because	“I	realize	that	I	am	wise	concerning	
nothing	great	or	small”	(Apology,	21b4-5).	Socrates	resolves	his	puzzlement	thus:	what	makes	no	one	wiser	
than	him	is	his	correct	appraisal	of	what	he	does	not	know.	“What	makes	him	the	wisest	of	the	Greeks	–what	
he	shares	with	no	one	he	has	yet	met-	is	his	recognition	that	he	fails	to	know	anything	fine	and	good.	Some	of	
those	he	has	met	know	things	he	does	not	know.	But	all	of	them	think	they	know	things	fine	and	good,	the	
most	important	things,	when	they	do	not.	Socrates,	alone	of	the	Greeks,	fails	to	have	this	false	belief	[…]	He	
alone	realizes	that	`in	truth	he	is	worthless	with	respect	to	wisdom’”.	
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Yet	so	far	the	debate	about	designing	decision-support	systems	in	value-loaded	applications	
has	paid	little	attention	to	the	extent	to	which	such	systems	may	be	designed	to	foster	this	
openness	to	being	called	into	question.	The	current	focus	on	various	value-incorporation	
strategies	in	fact	pulls	very	much	in	the	other	direction.	Whenever	such	strategies	succeed	
in	enabling	us	to	step	back	and	relax	-	somehow	trusting	machines	to	have	gotten	our	
‘moral	sums’	right-,	they	cannot	but	compromise	the	kind	of	critical	engagement	that	is	
essential	to	retaining	an	ability	to	being	called	into	question.	To	illustrate	the	extent	to	
which	the	latter	ability	is	all	too	easily	compromised	(even	in	an	‘off-line,	low-tech’	
environment),	consider	the	following	quote:	
	
‘	[T]he	horrible	thing	about	all	legal	officials,	even	the	best,	about	all	judges,	
magistrates,	barristers,	detectives,	and	policemen,	is	not	that	they	are	wicked	(some	
of	them	are	good),	not	that	they	are	stupid	(several	of	them	are	quite	intelligent).	It	is	
simply	that	they	have	got	used	to	it.	Strictly	they	do	not	see	the	prisoner	in	the	dock;	
all	they	see	is	the	usual	man	in	the	usual	place.	They	do	not	see	the	awful	court	of	
judgment;	they	only	see	their	own	workshop.’	(Chesterton,	1955)	
	
What	the	above-mentioned	‘legal	officials’	lack	is	not	cognitive	prowess	but	rather	a	
willingness	to	let	the	words	and	presence	of	others	reach	them.	Highly	habituated,	
frequently	activated	cognitive	skills	are	both	efficient	and	comfortable.	They	are	also	very	
good	at	warding	off	as	irrelevant	factors	that	might	otherwise	call	on	our	ethical	
responsibility	-	and	perhaps	demand	moral	change.	When	the	emotional	de-sensitization	
concomitant	with	professional	habituation	is	combined	with	the	effects	of	a	normative	
structure	that	is	designed	to	simplify	our	practical	reasoning	(a	legal	system	fits	the	bill,	but	
decision-support	systems	do	too),	we	are	likely	to	get	the	extensive	‘moral	holidays’	
scenario	described	above.		
	
The	answer	is	not	to	ditch	any	form	decision-support,	but	rather	to	design	the	latter	
differently.	Of	particular	interest,	in	terms	of	method,	are	systems	that	place	(and	retain)	
end-users	within	the	learning	loop	(this	approach	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘interactive	
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machine	learning’	or	‘IML’39).	An	explicit	requirement	to	keep	monitoring	the	result	of	the	
learning	process,	combined	with	a	demand	for	regular	input	on	the	part	of	end-users,	has	
the	potential	to	not	only	improve	the	system’s	learning	performance;	it	might	also	keep	
moral	torpor	at	bay:	For	IML	to	develop	into	a	-however	partial-	answer	to	the	‘moral	
muscle	atrophy’	problem	discussed	in	2.1,	one	may	for	instance	consider	the	introduction	of	
emotionally	charged,	provocative	scenarios	that	are	meant	to	get	end-users	to	consider	
critically	the	value	choices	informing	the	algorithms	they	routinely	rely	on.		
	
In	the	context	of	applications	designed	to	support	professionals	(medics,	lawyers	etc.),	short	
video	clips	that	are	meant	to	induce	some	perspective	reversal	(with	or	without	immersive	
Virtual	Reality40	tools)	could	prove	very	effective.	Ethical	lapses	within	professional	practice	
indeed	most	often	stem	from	a	failure	to	discern	ethically	relevant	considerations	which	
may	only	be	distantly	connected	to	the	problem	in	relation	to	which	a	professional	is	
consulted.	Whether	it	comes	to	the	need	to	take	into	account	the	vulnerability	of	a	patient’s	
family	member41,	say,	or	considering	the	impact	of	a	company’s	merger	upon	the	
environment	and	members	of	the	local	community,	an	ability	to	see	beyond	one’s	
immediate	query	does	condition	the	ethical	awareness	which	a	professional	needs	if	she	is	
to	live	up	to	her	particular	responsibility.42		
	
Professions-specific	automated	systems	can	and	should	be	designed	with	a	view	to	fostering	
such	perspective	widening.43	They	may	also	usefully	leverage	recent	research	on	the	factors	
																																																						
39	“Although	humans	are	an	integral	part	of	the	learning	process	(the	provide	labels,	rankings	etc.),	traditional	
machine	learning	systems	used	in	these	applications	are	agnostic	to	the	fact	that	inputs/outputs	are	from/for	
humans.	In	contrast,	interactive	machine	learning	places	end-users	in	the	learning	loop	(end	users	is	an	
integral	part	of	the	learning	process),	observing	the	result	of	learning	and	providing	input	meant	to	improve	
the	learning	outcome.	Canonical	applications	of	IML	include	scenarios	involving	humans	interacting	with	
robots	to	teach	them	to	perform	certain	tasks,	humans	helping	virtual	agents	play	computer	games	by	giving	
them	feedback	on	their	performance.”	(Wallach,	Wendell,	&	Allen,	2008)	
40	To	foster	such	perspective	reversal	(initially	in	the	context	of	psycho-therapy),	Mel	Slater	has	pioneered	the	
use	of	embodiment	techniques	(relying	on	sophisticated	immersive	virtual	reality	tools).	See	(Falconer	et	al.,	
2014;	Osimo,	Pizarro,	Spanlang,	&	Slater,	2015)		
41	For	a	study	examining	the	impact	of	expertise	and	cognitive	load	upon	a	GP’s	ability	to	pick	up	signs	of	child-
safeguarding	concerns,	see	(Pan	et	al.,	2018)	
42	The	nature	(and	ethical	grounds)	of	professional	responsibility	are	discussed	at	length	in	[…]	
43	They	may	also	usefully	leverage	recent	research	on	the	factors	that	impact	upon	individuals’	differential	
creativity	(Zabelina,	L.	Robinson,	D.	Council,	R,	&	Bresin,	2011).	Among	the	characteristics	used	to	assess	
such			,	fluency	and	flexibility	are	of	particular	relevance	when	it	comes	to	counter	the	effects	of	professional	
routinisation.	
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that	impact	upon	individuals’	differential	creativity.	Among	the	characteristics	used	to	
assess	such	creativity,	fluency	and	flexibility	are	of	particular	relevance	when	it	comes	to	
counter	the	effects	of	professional	routine.	Similarly,	they	can	and	should	encourage	an	
‘ethical	feedback	loop’	that	carves	a	continuous,	active	role	on	the	part	of	whichever	
professional	community	an	automated	system	is	designed	for.	The	latter	feedback	may	
allow	for	some	dynamic	process	of	adaptation	to	the	changing	values	of	end-users,	thus	
addressing	the	issue	related	to	the	dynamics	of	moral	change	addressed	in	section	2.1.	Yet	
aside	from	some	research	focusing	on	the	challenges	raised	by	multiple	people	interacting	
with	machine	learning	systems44,	there	does	not	seem	to	be	much	published	in	this	
‘interactive	machine	learning’	area	recently,	which	is	a	shame.	
	
3.2. 	Human	encounters	with	‘relatively	autonomous’	systems:	a	source	of	
ethically	relevant	surprises?	
	
Those	who	doubt	that	a	computer	may	ever	be	able	to	surprise	us	tend	to	be	influenced	by	
the	fact	that	computers	are,	at	bottom,	‘made	by	us’.	The	idea	that	only	something	that	
comes	from	‘outside	us’	may	surprise	us	is	related	to	the	romantic	intuition	that	underlies	
Lady	Lovelace’s	objection.	According	to	the	latter,	true	autonomy	requires	the	ability	to	
originate	something	new	in	a	radically	unprecedented	way.	To	the	extent	that	the	
intelligence	displayed	by	computers	is	not	only	enabled,	but	also	-within	‘traditional’	
algorithms	at	least-	manufactured	by	us,	non-trivial	surprises	should	not	arise,	or	so	the	
reasoning	goes.	That	reasoning	is	flawed	in	two	respects.	First,	it	proceeds	from	the	naïve	
assumption45	that	one	may	indeed	delineate	a	sphere	of	reality	that	is	wholly	‘outside	us’,	
uncontaminated	by	the	human	touch	(and	thus	apt	to	surprise	us).	Equally	problematic	is	
the	assumption	that	our	status	as	manufacturers	entails	that	we	cannot	but	have	a	perfect	
grasp	of	both	the	algorithm’s	cognitive	ramifications	and	its	potential	deployment	and	
impact	upon	our	world.		
	
																																																						
44	`An	important	opportunity	exists	to	investigate	how	crowds	of	people	might	collaboratively	drive	interactive	
machine	learning	systems,	potentially	scaling	up	the	impact	of	such	systems.	[…]	in	understanding	how	we	can	
coordinate	the	efforts	of	multiple	people	interacting	with	machine	learning	systems.’	(Amershi,	Camak,	Knox,	
&	Kulesza,	2014)	
45	That	assumption	itself	proceeds	from	a	Cartesian	dualism	that	aims	to	neatly	distinguish	the	`world	in	and	of	
itself’	from	human	impressions.	
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Now,	the	idea	that	non-trivial	surprises	cannot	arise	from	computers	that	are	‘made	by	us’	
not	only	proceeds	from	flawed	assumptions.	Today	it	is	also	fundamentally	outdated.	It	may	
only	have	become	fashionable	fairly	recently,	but	Machine	Learning	as	a	broad	methodology	
has	been	around	for	some	time.	According	to	Mitchell,	what	distinguishes	that	method	from	
‘traditional’	computer	science	(which	‘focuse[s]	primarily	on	how	to	manually	program	
computers’)	is	the	‘focu[s]	on	the	question	of	how	to	get	computers	to	program	themselves’		
(Tom	Michael	Mitchell,	2006).	This	way	of	characterising	Machine	Learning	puts	a	lot	of	
emphasis	on	the	relative	autonomy	of	the	system	-	perhaps	overly	so:	humans	indeed	play	a	
determinant	role	in	‘designing’	both	the	system	and	-to	a	varying	extent-	the	data	it	learns	
from,	particularly	in	so-called	supervised	learning	methods.46	The	importance	of	human	
input	is	better	captured	in	Mitchell’s	much-quoted	account,	according	to	which	‘a	computer	
program	is	said	to	learn	from	experience	E	with	respect	to	some	class	of	tasks	T	and	
performance	measure	P,	if	its	performance	at	tasks	T,	as	measured	by	P,	improves	with	
experience	E’	(T.M.	Mitchell,	1997).	Both	the	tasks	and,	crucially,	the	performance	measure	
are	determined	by	humans.	Even	the	‘experience’	itself	tends	to	necessitate	some	form	of	
processing	by	humans:	raw	data	is	indeed	messy	and	often	needs	to	be	packaged	in	order	
for	the	system	to	pick	relevant	or	‘useful’	variables.47	
	
Despite	all	that,	Machine	Learning	can	be	said	to	introduce	a	degree	of	relative	autonomy	
which	does	contribute	to	deflating	the	appeal	of	the	misguided	(and	romantic)	notion	that	
autonomy	can	only	be	considered	as	a	radical,	either/or	proposition:	either	one	is	totally	
free	of	prior	norms	or	constraints,	and	hence	autonomous,	or	one	is	not.48	In	its	current	
																																																						
46	Handwriting	recognition	is	one	of	the	tasks	that	lends	itself	to	a	supervised	learning	approach:	one	might	
feed	a	system	with	a	set	of	example	pairs	(x,	y)	where	“x”	corresponds	to	the	images	containing	handwriting	
and	“y”	identifies	which	character	is	being	read.	The	aim	of	the	learning	process	is	to	find	a	function	f:X	→Y		
that	matches	the	example	pairs.	In	unsupervised	learning,	by	contrast,	some	unlabelled	data	x	is	given,	and	the	
aim	is	to	infer	a	function	that	reveals	some	hidden	structure	within	the	data.	In	reinforcement	learning,	the	set	
of	data	x	is	not	given.	Instead	it	is	generated	by	an	agent’s	interaction	with	the	environment.	The	aim	of	the	
learning	process	is	to	come	up	with	an	action-selection	policy	that	minimises	some	measure	of	long-term	cost.	
47	For	further	discussion	see	(Veale,	2017)	
48	`What	Lovelace	is	looking	for	may	require	a	kind	of	autonomy	that	is	beyond	the	bounds	of	ordinary	
causation	and	mathematics.	The	notion	that	creativity	requires	autonomy	is	one	anticipated,	at	least	in	
nascent	terms,	by	Hofstadter	(1995,	411),	who	seems	confident	that	computation	will	ultimately	be	up	to	the	
task	of	capturing	the	kind	of	autonomy	creative	humans	exploit.	But	what	if	the	kind	of	`thinking	for	oneself’	
required	by	LT	entails	a	form	of	autonomy	known	as	agent	causation?	The	doctrine	of	agent	causation,	which	
is	set	out,	defended,	and	shown	to	be	beyond	ordinary	computation	in	`Chapter	VIII:	Free	Will’	of	Bringsjord	
1992,	entails	the	view	that	persons	bring	about	certain	states	of	affairs	(e.g.	mental	events	like	decisions)	
directly,	with	no	ordinary	physical	causal	chain	in	the	picture.’	(Bringsjord,	Bello,	&	Ferrucci,	2001,	p.	25)	
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form,	Machine	Learning	aims	to	approximate	the	way	in	which	we	humans	typically	do	
update	the	models	governing	our	understanding	of	what	we	do	(and	who	we	are)	in	the	
light	of	the	data	we	are	confronted	with.	Because	and	to	the	extent	that	they	succeed	in	this	
approximation,	machine	learning	applications	have	the	potential	to	teach	us	things	we	
never	anticipated	(or	did	not	know	we	wanted	to	know),	both	about	ourselves,	and	about	
the	way	we	run	our	lives.		
	
In	the	world	of	games,	Machine	Learning’s	recent	forays	into	the	world	of	GO	has	already	
contributed	novel	ways	of	approaching	(and	playing)	the	game		(Silver	et	al.,	2016).	Might	
something	similar	happen	to	the	way	we	navigate	our	way	around	-and	structure	normative	
claims	about-	our	world?	Could	our	growing	interaction	with	machine	learning	applications,	
which	may	be	said	to	present	us	with	a	very	sharp	(or	accelerated)	mirror,	generate	
unexpected	insights	into	who	we	are,	and	what	we	care	about?	This	kind	of	question	has	
been	asked	before,	but	until	recently	it	was	mostly	confined	to	the	realms	of	‘what	happens	
if	we	encounter	aliens’,	science-fiction	accounts.	To	confront	instead	this	question	in	the	
context	of	our	encounters	with	machines	that	we	are	very	much	in	the	process	of	designing	
is	both	exciting	and	daunting,	given	the	amplitude	of	the	responsibility	it	entails.		
	
Design	those	machines	so	as	to	maximise	the	extent	to	which	we	may	offload	thorny	ethical	
issues,	and	we	may	grant	ourselves	‘moral	holidays’	-	at	a	cost.	Design	them	instead	to	
periodically	jolt	us	out	of	our	moral	torpor,	and	we	might	retain	enough	moral	muscle	to	be	
able	to	stand	up	and	question	our	social	practices	when	they	are	wanting.	Decision-support	
systems	can	and	should	be	designed	to	that	effect.	What	about	fully	autonomous,	artificial	
agents?	If	ethical	agency	is	defined	by	reference	to	our	ongoing	endeavour	to	answer	the	
‘how	should	I/we	live?’	question,	it	is	far	from	clear	whether	such	autonomous	artificial	
agents	(if	indeed	they	were	to	see	light	of	day)	could	accurately	be	described	as	partaking	in	
that	ongoing	endeavour.	No	matter	how	much	we	try	to	shape	them	in	our	image,	their	
experiencing	novelty	in	a	way	that	is	so	different	from	us	makes	such	autonomous	artificial	
agents	likely	to	evolve	past	the	point	of	mutual	intelligibility.	Without	the	latter,	it	is	shock,	
rather	than	surprise,	that	awaits	us.	
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Conclusion	
	
	
There	is	much	to	learn	from	what	Turing	too	hastily	dismissed	as	Lady	Lovelace’s	‘objection’:	
‘digital	computers’	can	indeed	surprise	us.	And	that’s	not	merely	because	our	calculations	or	
predictions	fail	more	often	than	computers’	do.	Prediction	failures	are	expected.	Just	like	a	
piece	of	art,	a	film	or	a	novel,	computers	(or	their	algorithms)	can	be	designed	in	such	a	way	
as	to	lead	us	to	question	our	understanding	of	the	world,	or	our	place	within	it.	Some	
humans	do	lose	the	capacity	to	be	surprised	in	that	way:	it	might	be	fear,	or	it	might	be	the	
comfort	of	all-encompassing,	ideological	certainties.	As	lazy	normative	animals,	we	do	need	
to	be	able	to	rely	on	various	authorities	to	simplify	our	practical	reasoning:	that’s	ok.	Yet	the	
growing	sophistication	of	computer	systems	designed	to	systematically	free	us	from	the	
constraints	of	normative	engagement	may	well	take	us	past	a	point	of	no-return:	what	if,	
through	lack	of	normative	exercise,	our	‘moral	muscles’	became	so	atrophied	as	to	leave	us	
unable	to	stand	against	our	social	practices	when	they	are	wanting?	
	
Some	may	welcome	the	above	scenario:	if	our	normative	laziness	stems	from	the	
comforting	knowledge	that	we	are	safely	in	the	care	of	an	all-knowing,	benign	
‘superintelligence’	setting	us	on	the	path	to	moral	righteousness,	why	worry?	In	contrast	to	
those	who	believe	that	a	final	answer	to	the	‘how	should	we	live?’	question	is	both	available	
in	principle	and	desirable,	others	insist	that	ethics	-just	like	human	nature-	cannot	but	
remain	a	work-in-progress.	So	they	worry:	the	cost	of	some	AI-enabled	moral	perfectionism	
might	well	be	the	end	of	ethics.	It	is	uncommon	for	the	implications	of	contrasting	meta-
ethical	stands	to	find	such	concrete	illustration.	This	paper	has	not	only	tried	to	outline	
those	implications	within	the	choices	underlying	the	design	of	both	(putative)	autonomous	
artificial	agents	and	decision-support	systems	meant	for	morally	loaded	contexts.	It	also	
makes	two	distinct	normative	claims:		
	
1. Decision-support	systems	should	be	designed	with	a	view	to	regularly	jolting	us	out					
of	our	moral	torpor.	In	this	context,	the	potential	of	various	interactive	machine	
learning	methodologies	may	prove	a	fruitful	avenue	for	further	research.		
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2. Without	the	depth	of	habit	to	emotionally	(and	somatically)	‘anchor’	model	
certainty,	a	computer’s	experience	of	something	new	cannot	but	remain	very	
different	from	that	which	in	humans	gives	rise	to	non-trivial	surprises.	This	
asymmetry	has	important	repercussions	when	it	comes	to	ethical	agency,	and	the	
shape	the	latter	would	take	in	so-called	‘artificial	moral	agents’:	it	is	not	just	that	
they	would	be	likely	to	‘leap	morally	ahead’	of	us,	unencumbered	by	the	weight	of	
habits	(if	it	were,	mutual	intelligibility	would	merely	be	a	matter	of	decelerating	
evolution).	The	main	reason	to	doubt	that	the	moral	trajectories	of	humans	v.	
autonomous	systems	might	remain	compatible	stems	from	the	fundamental	
asymmetry	in	the	mechanisms	underlying	moral	change.	Whereas	for	humans	
surprises	and	emotional	encounters	will	continue	to	play	an	important	role	in	waking	
us	to	the	need	for	moral	change	(for	as	long	as	we	remain	capable	of	ethics),	
cognitive	processes	are	likely	to	rule	when	it	comes	to	machines.	This	asymmetry	
cannot	but	translate	into	increasingly	different	moral	outlooks,	to	the	point	of	(likely)	
unintelligibility.	The	latter	prospect	is	enough	to	doubt	the	desirability	of	
autonomous	moral	agents.	
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